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A CHANGE OF HEART OR A CHANGE OF
LAW? WITHDRAWING A GUILTY PLEA
UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 32(e)
KIRKE D. WEAVER"
Our criminal justice system is awash in plea bargaining. Be-
cause of the overwhelming number of criminal cases processed
through plea bargaining, courts are unquestionably reluctant to
permit defendants to withdraw from their plea agreements once
approved by the court. For if such agreements are readily open
to second-guessing by defendants, the purpose of plea bargain-
ing-the efficient adjudication of criminal cases-would be se-
verely undermined. However, each significant appellate
decision changing some aspect of criminal law raises a serious
and potentially problematic question: Should that change per-
mit each affected defendant to re-evaluate his or her decision to
enter into the plea agreement and ultimately withdraw his or
her guilty plea based upon the new ruling? In all but the most
egregious cases, courts have emphatically answered no-even in
cases where the defendant has yet to be sentenced under the
agreement. Given the sheer number of potentially affected plea
bargains, this result should come as no surprise. But are courts
getting the answer right? Are they paying homage to the goal of
finality and efficiency at the expense of defendants' rights? This
Article seeks to answer these questions using the very tools that
courts often use to evaluate and to interpret plea agreements-
the principles of contract law. While these doctrines do not
permit defendants to re-open plea agreements at will, they do
offer additional relief to some defendants by providing a more
flexible method for analyzing such motions as well as a rational
justification for granting the relief that the defendants seek.
" Associate, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP; law clerk to the Honorable Morton I.
Greenberg, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 1997-1998; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1997; B.A., summa cum laude, College of William and Mary, 1994.
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I. WITHDRAWING A GUILTY PLEA'
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e), a defen-
dant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his or her
2guilty plea prior to sentencing. Instead, a court will permit a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing only "if
the defendant shows any fair and just reason."' To determine
whether a defendant has met this standard, courts have devel-
oped a four-part balancing test: "(1) whether defendant estab-
lished a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea; (2) whether
defendant asserts his legal innocence of the charge; (3) the
This Article will analyze motions to withdraw guilty pleas made prior to
sentencing. Those brought after sentencing are governed by a different standard-as
petitions for habeas corpus-and are thus beyond the scope of the Article.
2See, e.g., United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Marrero-Rivera, 124 F.3d 342, 347 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
Isom, 85 F.3d 831, 834 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 236, 238
(6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Burnett, 671 F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 26
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 632.30[1] [a], at 632-91
(1988).
'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e) provides:
If a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence
is imposed, the court may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any
fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or by
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
FED. R. CRuM. P. 32(e); see also United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 671 (1997); United
States v. Muriel, 111 F.3d 975, 978 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Knight, 96 F.3d
307, 309 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
The burden is placed on the defendant to set forth a fair and just reason. See Burnett,
671 F.2d at 712.
Although courts profess to construe Rule 32 motions to withdraw a guilty plea
"liberally," courts rarely grant such motions, and the reversal of such motions on
appeal is uncommon. Compare Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 631 F.2d
214 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[M]otions to withdraw guilty pleas made before sentencing
should be liberally construed in favor of the accused and should be granted freely."),
United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same), United States v.
Hickok, 907 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1990) (same), United States v. Schubert, 728 F.2d
1364, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[S]uch motions before sentence is imposed should be
allowed with great liberality."), United States v. Presley, 478 F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir.
1973) (same), Bergen v. United States, 145 F.2d 181, 187 (8th Cir. 1944) ("[T]he
court's discretion should be exercised liberally, so as to promote the ends of justice
and to safeguard the life and liberty of the accused ...."), and United States v.
Artabane, 868 F. Supp. 76, 77 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that courts should grant such
motions "liberally in favor of the accused."), with United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d
208, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that because granting such motions are
discretionary, appellate reversal [is] uncommon."), and 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 537, at 188 (1982) (noting that appellate
courts "rarely interfere" with decisions of the district court regarding the withdrawal
of guilty pleas).
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length of time between the guilty plea and the motion to with-
draw; and (4) if the defendant established a fair and just reason
for withdrawal, whether the government would be prejudiced."A
Each of these factors poses a potential pitfall for the defendant
seeking to withdraw a guilty plea.
A. A FAIR AND JUST REASON
In a fit of redundancy, courts have first required a defen-
dant to demonstrate a "fair and just reason" to withdraw a guilty
plea pursuant to the "fair and just reason" standard found in
Rule 32(e).' Such a showing "is a necessary, but not sufficient,
predicate to plea withdrawal., 6 Even though it is a required fac-
tor-and the only factor mentioned in Rule 32(e)-courts sim-
ply fail to discuss what a fair and just reason actually is.7 Instead,
courts merely examine whether the defendant has satisfied the
other three factors of the balancing test.8 In essence, this factor
merely mimics the overall standard without providing any addi-
tional means for a court to evaluate whether the defendant has
' United States v. Fitzhugh, 78 F.3d 1326, 1328 (8th Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Sanchez-
Barreto, 93 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1996). See generally Howard G. Alperin, Annotation,
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere Before Sentencing Under Rule 32(d) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 6 A.L.R. FED. 665 (1971) (collecting cases regarding
these factors).
In addition to these four basic standards, some courts have also considered "the
circumstances underlying the entry of the guilty plea; ... the defendant's nature and
background; ... [and] the degree to which the defendant has had prior experience
with the criminal justice system .... " United States v. Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1181
(6th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir.
1996) (considering five factors); Hickok, 807 F.2d at 986 n.2 (considering seven
factors); United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 1984) (same); G. NICHOLAS
HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 199 (1997).
See, e.g., Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d at 324; Isom, 85 F.3d at 834; Bashara, 27 F.3d at
1181; Burnett, 671 F.2d at 712.
6 Gonzales, 202 F.3d at 23.
7 The drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure acknowledge the
problem with this standard, noting that "'the terms 'fair and just' lack any pretense of
scientific exactness."' FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e) advisory committee's note; see also
Spencer, 836 F.2d at 238 (same); Barker, 514 F.2d at 220 (noting that the standard
provides "rough guidelines"); 3 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 537, at 190 ("[T]he
standards on when a motion ought to be granted are not easily defined.").
' See, e.g., Spencer, 836 F.2d at 238-39 (noting that these factors are those which "a
district court may consider when evaluating whether a defendant has established a
'fair and just' reason to withdraw his guilty plea"); 26 MooRE ET AL., supra note 2,
632.30[l][b][i], at 632-92 to 632-93 (1988); see also G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA
BARGAINING (1997 & Supp. 1999).
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actually met the overall standard. Thus, the true analysis for the
Rule 32 standard currently focuses only on innocence, delay,
and prejudice.
B. THE DECLARATION OF INNOCENCE
Of these three remaining factors, the most critical is the de-
fendant's declaration of innocence. In fact, failing to assert the
defendant's innocence will result in the automatic denial of the
motion.9 Yet the defendant cannot merely claim innocence, for
as one court has stated, "there are few if any criminal cases
where the defendant cannot devise some theory or story which,
if believed by ajury, would result in his acquittal."1 Instead, the
defendant must assert some factual" or legal 2 basis for the as-
' See, e.g., Gonzales, 202 F.3d at 24. But see Oksanen v. United States, 362 F.2d 74, 79
(8th Cir. 1966) ("[The question of innocence of the accused is normally not
involved in the application to withdraw a plea of guilty."); Woodring v. United States,
248 F.2d 166, 169 (8th Cir. 1957) ("The question of a defendant's guilt or innocence
is not an issue ... for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty .. "); United States v. Tateo,
214 F. Supp. 560, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that the "defendant's guilty or
innocence is not an issue").
" Barker, 514 F.2d at 221; see also United States v. Holland, 117 F.3d 589, 594 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Isom, 85 F.3d at 837; United States v. Fitzhugh, 78 F.3d 1326, 1328 (8th
Cir. 1996) ("The plea of guilty is a solemn act not to be disregarded because of
belated misgivings about [its] wisdom."); United States v. Rojas, 898 F.2d 40, 43 (5th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting a motion where the defendant made unsupported statements of
innocence and "overwhelming evidence" existed against him); United States v. Carr,
740 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[A]lthough the defendant has asserted his innocence,
this claim alone is far from being sufficient to overturn denial of a withdrawal motion.
Otherwise, the mere assertion of legal innocence would always be a sufficient
condition for withdrawal, and withdrawal would effectively be an automatic right."
(citations omitted)); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 220 (3d
Cir. 1980) (holding that an assertion of innocence needs to be credible). See generally
United States v. Gomez-Orozco, 188 F.3d 422, 425 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that legal
innocence is sufficient, but such a claim "must be supported by credible evidence");
Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d at 326 ("Assertions of innocence must be buttressed by facts
in the record which support a claimed defense." (citation omitted)); United States v.
Hickok, 907 F.2d 983, 986 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the mere assertion of
innocence is not enough); United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449, 455 (1st Cir.
1983) (finding that although legal innocence is sufficient "the mere protestation of
legal innocence cannot in and of itself be issue-determinative"); United States v.
Allen, 981 F. Supp. 564, 577 (N.D. Iowa 1997) ("Courts have, however, 'dealt
carefully' with motions to withdraw guilty pleas 'based upon newly discovered
evidence, or a previously unknown or unavailable defense."').
" United States v. Ramos, 810 F.2d 308, 312 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the
"defendant's factual contentions" must create a "'legally cognizable defense' to the
charges").
1 See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (vacating a
guilty plea based upon an argument of legal innocence); Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d at
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sertion of innocence." Factual innocence, on the one hand,
means that based upon all of the facts before the court, the de-
fendant is not guilty of a crime that has been charged: for in-
stance, the defendant has an airtight alibi, or the actual acts
performed by the defendant do not amount to a crime. Under
both situations, the defendant is "factually" innocent of the
crime charged. Legal innocence, on the other hand, asks the
court to disregard certain incriminating evidence in order to es-
tablish the defendant's innocence: for example, the only evi-
dence linking the defendant to the crime was illegally seized or
obtained in violation of the defendant's right against self-
incrimination. Without that evidence, the prosecution cannot
go forward, and the defendant will be found not guilty.
As a further illustration, in United States v. Groll,"4 the defen-
dant moved to withdraw her guilty plea at her sentencing hear-
ing based upon her legal innocence. After retaining new
counsel, Groll learned that because the witness who had goaded
her into selling drugs was actually a confidential informant, she
had a viable entrapment defense to the charges." Even though
Groll had admitted the underlying facts that amounted to a
crime during the guilty plea hearing, she asked the court to dis-
regard that evidence because it was improperly obtained
through her entrapment. 16 The court recognized that although
"claims of innocence alone do not mandate permission to with-
draw a plea ... being legally innocent of the crime is a fair and
just reason to withdraw a guilty plea" as long as such assertions
are "substantiated by evidence.' 7  Because her entrapment
claim was colorable and did "not contradict her admissions at
the change of plea hearing," the court permitted Groll to with-
326 ("Assertions of innocence must be buttressed by facts in the record which
support a claimed defense." (citation omitted)); United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d
1145, 1151 (4th Cir. 1995); Barker, 514 F.2d at 220 (holding that legal innocence is a
factor in deciding whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea); see also
FED. R. CIv. P. 32(e) advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendment (noting that
legal innocence is a factor to consider).
13 Even though legal innocence can provide a basis to withdraw a guilty plea, courts
look more favorably on claims of factual innocence, finding that they are "stronger
assertions of innocence than are claims that the defendant has affirmative defenses to
the charges." United States v. Sanchez, Crim. No. 96-646, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22145, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 1998).
,4992 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1993).
I d at 759-60.
16 Id at 758-60.
17 Id. at 758.
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draw her guilty plea.' As this case demonstrates, once inno-
cence is established, a court is hard-pressed to deny a defen-
dant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
C. DELAY IN BRINGING THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW
Beyond requiring an assertion of innocence, courts also
demand that defendants take prompt action to make that asser-
tion. 9 The longer the wait to bring a motion to withdraw a plea,
the less likely a court will be to grant the motion.0 Courts view
timeliness as a rough proxy for the strength of the reason to
withdraw the guilty plea. If a defendant had been truly mis-
taken in entering the plea, the defendant would move quickly to
withdraw it. The longer the defendant waits to withdraw the
plea, the less likely the decision was made in error. The longer
the defendant waits, the more likely the defendant's motion is
based on strategic reasons unrelated to whether the defendant
properly entered into the plea agreement.
As a method to refine this rough factor of delay, courts
evaluate whether the defendant gained any strategic benefit by
waiting to withdraw the guilty plea.2 ' Delaying such a motion
until after the trial or sentencing of co-defendants could pro-
vide the defendant with the opportunity to preview the govern-
ment's evidence and trial strategy, as well as to discover the
potential punishments. If a defendant has enjoyed such bene-
"Id. at 759-60.
See, e.g., United States v. Chant, No. 98-10088, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29792, at
*8-9 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 1999) (memorandum opinion) (rejecting a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea because although the defendant asserted his innocence, it was not based
upon new evidence and thus looked as thought the motion was based merely on a
"change of heart"); United States v. Ramos, 810 F.2d 308, 312 (1st Cir. 1987); see also
3 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 538, at 201; Alperin, supra note 4, at 670, 680.
20See, e.g., United States v. Marrero-Rivera, 124 F.3d 342, 352 (1st Cir. 1997) ("'The
rule of thumb is that the longer a defendant waits before moving to withdraw his
plea, the more potency his motion must have in order to gain favorable
consideration.'"); United States v. Sanchez-Barreto, 93 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1996)
(same); United States v. Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d 368, 373 (1st Cir. 1994) (same);
United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he longer a defendant
delays in filing a withdrawal motion, the more substantial reasons he must proffer in
support of his motion."); see also United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 222 (D.C. Cir.
1975) ("A swift change in heart is itself strong indication that the plea was entered in
haste and confusion ...."); United States v. Shillitani, 16 F.R.D. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
(noting that a long delay "suggests [the motion] was an afterthought); 26 MOORE ET
AL., supra note 2, 632.30[1] [b] [iii], at 632-95 (same).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Parrella-Tirado, 22 F.3d 368, 378 (1st Cir. 1994) (evalu-
ating the factor of delay in terms of the strategic benefits gained by the delay).
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fits through delay, courts examine such motions with a much
more discriminating eye.22 Thus, delay in bringing a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea only serves to impose a greater burden on
the defendant to convince the court to grant relief.
25
D. PREJUDICE TO THE GOVERNMENT
If a defendant has put forth evidence of innocence without
undue delay, courts then consider whether the government
would be prejudiced by permitting the defendant to withdraw
the guilty plea.2 ' Such prejudice could arise where the govern-
ment would have difficulty presenting its case at a subsequent
trial-because witnesses have dispersed or cannot be located 5
22See Cordero v. United States, 533 F.2d 723, 725 (1st Cir. 1976); see also United States
v. Giuliano, 348 F.2d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1965) ("To permit the withdrawal of the plea at
this stage would encourage entering the plea merely as a trial balloon to test the attitude
of the trial court. This stratagem has been properly condemned.").
2' Because the question of improper delay is so fact specific, broad generalities
cannot be made regarding how long is too long. Courts have found time periods
ranging from merely 13 days to 10 '/ years to be too long to bring a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea. See Ramos, 810 F.2d at 313 (delay of 13 days too long);
Oksanen, 362 F.2d 74 (delay of 10 1/ years too long); see also Marrero-Rivera, 124 F.3d at
352 (14 weeks); United States v. Isom, 85 F.3d 831, 839 (1st Cir. 1996) (2 months);
United States v. Fitzhugh, 78 F.3d 1326, 1328 (8th Cir.) (9 months); United States v.
Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1994) (6 weeks); Carr, 740 F.2d at 345 (22 days);
Burnett, 671 F.2d at 712 (5 years); United States v. Shillitani, 16 F.R.D. 336, 339
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (3 years).
'See, e.g., 26 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, 632.30[1][b] [i], at 632-93 ("In
evaluating motions withdraw, the court should first require the defendant to provide
a fair orjust reason."); see also Carr, 740 F.2d at 343; United States v. Rassmussen, 642
F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the failure to show prejudice does not
result in an automatic grant of the motion to withdraw a guilty plea); United States v.
Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1969) (requiring "substantial prejudice").
2See, e.g., United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1988) (considering "the
time, money, and effort the government would have to devote to reassembling
witnesses and evidence that were allowed to scatter after the acceptance of the guilty
plea."); United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 499, 455 (1st Cir. 1983) ("The most
common form of prejudice is the difficulty that the government would encounter in
reassembling its witnesses ...."); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 631 F.2d
214, 221 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding prejudice where one key witness could not be
located and others had dispersed); United States v. Brown, 617 F.2d 54, 55 (4th Cir.
1980) (per curiam) (finding prejudice where witnesses were notified they did not
have to appear for trial); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 619 F. Supp. 570, 576
(D.P.R. 1958) (finding prejudice where the main witness was in prison, and the
government "has lost track of its [other] witnesses"); see also United States v.
Tammaro, 93 F.R.D. 826, 830 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (finding prejudice where witnesses
were out of state and one was in the witness protection program and would face
increased danger by additional travel); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, PLEAS
OF GUILTY 89 (3d ed. 1999); 3 DAVID S. RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 12.05[1] at 12-65 (1999).
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or where evidence has already been destroyed.26 More mun-
dane tasks, such as the re-assembly of trial preparation materi-
als, have also been deemed to establish prejudice to the
government. In fact, the same factors considered in whether a
defendant gained a strategic benefit through delay also can es-
tablish prejudice to the government-such as waiting to with-
draw a plea until the eve of trial18 or waiting until after the
government has presented its case against a co-defendant.29 The
longer the delay, the more likely the defendant has gained a
30tactical advantage at the government's expense .
26See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 89 (3d ed. 1999);
3 DAVID S. RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1 12.05[1], at 12-65
(1999).
2See, e.g., Brown, 617 F.2d at 55 (finding prejudice where the government's trial
preparation had been dismantled); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 619 F. Supp.
570, 576 (D.P.R. 1985) (finding prejudice where the government had dismantled its
case); see also United States v. Strauss, 563 F.2d 127, 131 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding
prejudice where the government would have to recreate trial preparation); United
States v. Figueroa, Crim. No. 91-518-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15615, at *29 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 15, 1992) ("[T]he government would have to prepare for trial against defendant
twice, with the risks and prejudice inherent in doing so."). However, the mere fact
that the defendant will exercise his or her constitutional right to go to trial is not
sufficient prejudice to the government. See United States v. Allen, 981 F. Supp. 564,
572-73 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (requiring prejudice "beyond the necessity of taking a
matter to trial, which merely requires the exercise of the defendant's constitutional
rights, instead of 'pleading it out."').
"See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 640 F.2d 170, 172 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding
prejudice where three trials had already occurred); Strauss, 563 F.2d at 131 (finding
prejudice where the plea had been entered on eve of trial); United States v. Crowley,
529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding prejudice where the plea had been
entered on day of trial); United States v. Fernandez, 734 F. Supp. 599, 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1990 (finding prejudice where the plea had been entered on the "eve of summations"
during trial).
21See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding
prejudice where the plea had been entered during the trial of co-defendants);
Figueroa, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15615, at *29 (finding prejudice where a trial of a co-
defendant "revealed all the tactics and strategy that it had planned to use at trial
against defendant. Defendant therefore has a preview of the government's case
against him. This in itself constitutes prejudice.").
"See Kobrosky, 711 F.2d at 455 ("[T]he longer the delay in moving for a plea
withdrawal, the greater this prejudice is likely to be."). Some courts have also
considered its inconvenience as well. See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 345
(5th Cir. 1997); Kobrosky, 711 F.2d at 455 ("[T]he court may properly consider any
substantial inconvenience it would suffer were the plea to be withdrawn."); Barker,
514 F.2d at 222; United States v. Fernandez, 734 F. Supp. 599, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
("To allow Fernandez to withdraw his guilty plea in the circumstances of this case
would undermine confidence in the integrity of judicial procedures, increase the
volume ofjudicial work, and delay and impair the orderly administration ofjustice.").
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A finding of prejudice, however, will not automatically re-
sult in the denial of the defendant's motion. Instead, such a
finding heightens the defendant's burden to withdraw the plea,
requiring the defendant's justification for the withdrawal to
meet "exceptionally high standards.""' Thus, as with a finding of
undue delay, the defendant must prove to the court that the
reasons for withdrawing the plea heavily outweigh the potential
prejudice that such an action would impose on the government.
II. AN INTERVENING CHANGE IN THE LAW
Weighing these four factors (and primarily the innocence
factor), courts decide whether a defendant should be permitted
to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing under Rule 32(e).
One event that can prompt a defendant to bring this type of a
motion is a change in the law, such as a judicial decision invali-
dating part of a criminal statute that relates to the defendant's
plea.
" Car, 740 F.2d at 343; see also United States v. Mathis, 963 F.2d 399, 410 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Barker, 514 F.2d at 222.
" Permitting a change in the law to "re-open" the defendant's guilty plea has a
parallel in civil contexts. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a party may
move to alter or amend a judgment based upon an intervening change in the law.
See, e.g., Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.
1998) ("[T]here are three grounds for amending an earlier judgment [under Rule
59(e)]: (1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account
for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice."); see also Abrams v. Communications Workers of Am., 187 F.R.D.
12, 13 (D.D.C. 1999) ("[T]he district court has the discretion to grant a Rule 59(e)
motion if the court finds (1) an intervening change of controlling law, (2) the
availability of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice."). See generally Abrams,187 F.R.D. at 14 (holding that an
intervening Supreme Court case did not amount to a change in the law because the
"Supreme Court went to unusual lengths ... to limit the scope of its ruling, expressly
disavowing any intention to reach" the arguments at issue in this case). However, as
in the criminal context, if the change in law occurs well after the entry ofjudgment,
courts are much more hesitant to overturn the final decision of the court. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(6); Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1990)
("A change in decisional law after entry ofjudgment does not constitute exceptional
circumstances and is not alone grounds for relief from a final judgment"); see also
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 131 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir.
1997) (same); Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir. 1995) ("A
circuit court's announcement of a new rule of federal law, like a Supreme Court
pronouncement, is similarly insufficient without more to justify Rule 60(b)(6)
relief."); Holland v. Virginia Lee Co., 188 F.R.D. 241, 252 (W.D. Va. 1999) ("[Ilt is
well established that a supervening change in decisional law on its own is insufficient
to afford relief under Rule 60(b) (6).").
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Under the current Rule 32(e) test for withdrawing guilty
pleas, if a defendant brings the motion to withdraw promptly af-
ter learning of the change, delay should not be an issue-the
defendant could not have brought the motion previously be-
cause the change had not yet occurred.33
The government might oppose such a motion on the
ground of prejudice, but it is far more likely to argue that the
defendant has waived any right to challenge the plea by admit-
ting the criminal conduct at issue during the guilty plea hear-
ing. Fearing the re-opening of a wave of guilty pleas, courts
have, on occasion, accepted this argument.34 However, in order
for the waiver of the right to challenge the plea to be effective, it
must be knowing and voluntary.5 If the law changes only after
the defendant entered into the guilty plea, the defendant can-
not have knowingly waived an argument based on the subsequent
change in the law.36 While a motion to withdraw a plea would
"See United States v. Gomez-Orozco, 188 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 1999). However,
conditions of confinement are not seen as a valid excuse for delay. See United States
v. Mignogna, 157 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1983) (defendant was in maximum security
confinement but had access to an attorney).
Of course, a policy of not counting the delay until a defendant knows of the
change in the law could run the risk of encouraging "willful blindness" by defendants
and their attorneys. Failing to factor this delay could result in defendants and their
attorneys failing to diligently search new case law in order to preserve a later
argument regarding the withdrawal of a guilty plea. However, while this policy could
give rise to some tactical maneuvering, such "willful blindness" actually runs counter
to the main motivating factor behind the defendant's and the attorney's goal-
obtaining the defendant's freedom. The sooner the defendant finds out about the
change in the law, the sooner the defendant can argue that the guilty plea should be
withdrawn. Thus, this fear should not undermine the approach of factoring delay
only after the defendant learns of the change in the law.
" See, e.g., United States v. Morris, No. 98-133, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13321 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 31, 1999).
" See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ("[T]he plea is more than an
admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that judgment of conviction
may be entered without a trial-a waiver of his right to trial before ajury or a judge.
Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing,
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences."); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) ("A plea
of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is 'voluntary' and 'intelligent"'
(citation omitted)); United States v. Presley, 478 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1973)
(holding that as a result of a change in the law, no waiver occurred because the plea
was not knowing); Bell v. United States, 917 F. Supp. 681, 684 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
("[Tihe plea must have been voluntary and knowing to comport with the
requirements of the Due Process Clause.").
See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 923 F.2d 1346, 1358 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Lucia, 416 F.2d 920, 922 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that a change in the law
"cannot be said to waive a right" because it "was judicially created after the supposed
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be considered too late if the defendant was aware (or should
have known) of the change at the time the plea was made,"
courts do not require attorneys to predict changes in the law.38
Thus, because the changes in the law occur after the guilty plea
hearing, courts generally reject this waiver argument.
Even though defendants are likely to satisfy the delay and
prejudice factors, the most important factor of the current
test-innocence-still looms as a major impediment to relief.
And not every change in the law is created equal, for not all
changes in the law address the innocence factor.0 Potentially
waiver"); United States v. Tammaro, 93 F.R.D. 826, 828 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (holding that
a change in the law "might render a guilty plea ineffective as not a knowing and
intentional relinquishing of the right to trial.").
37See United States v. Silva, 122 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Spencer,
836 F.2d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1987) ("However, where a defendant is aware of the
condition or reason for a plea withdrawal, at the time the guilty plea is entered, a case for
withdrawal is weaker.").
'8 See Cepulonis v. Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 575 (1st Cir. 1983) ("[Clounsel need not
chase wild factual geese .... "); Paulino v. United States, No. 97-Civ-2107, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5966, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998) (holding that a defense attorney
does not have to be "omniscient"). See generally Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450, 454
(2d Cir. 1988) ("Were we to penalize [the defendant] for failing to challenge such
entrenched precedent, we would ascribe to attorneys and their clients the power to
prognosticate with greater precision than the judges of this court.").
" Similar reasoning can also be found in civil context under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). See, e.g., Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 605-06
(4th Cir. 1999) ("The intervening law exception to the general rule that the failure to
raise an issue timely in the district court waives review of that issue on appeal applies
when 'there was strong precedent' prior to the change, such that the failure to raise
the issue was not unreasonable and the opposing party was not prejudiced by the
failure to raise the issue sooner.") (citation omitted); see also Pittston Co. v. United
States, 199 F.3d 694, 706 n.9 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
'0 Of course, a fundamental question should be "What is a change in the law?"
While courts have not addressed this question very frequently in the criminal context,
some courts have dealt with the issue in the civil arena. In these decisions, they have
held that such changes must announce "a new legal principle that was previously
unavailable to the appellant, for all practical purposes." Kattan v. District of
Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Quinones-Ruiz v. United States,
873 F. Supp. 359, 361-62 (S.D. Cal. 1995); United States v. Serafini, 898 F. Supp. 287
(M.D. Pa. 1994); In re Doris D. Coby, 154 B.R. 316, 319 (Bankr. Nev. 1993) (holding
that a change in law occurred because "[t] his Court would have followed the holding
in" the new decision "if that decision had been rendered at the time the judgment");
Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1989). See generally
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Byers, 151 F.3d 574, 580 (6th Cir. 1998) (granting relief because
"[t]he action of the Ohio Supreme Court in reversing itself within one year is
certainly an unusual occurrence."); Cespedes v. Coughlin, 969 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (granting relief based upon two intervening Second Circuit cases); Allen v.
Shalala, 835 F. Supp. 462, 464-65 (N.D. I11. 1993) (granting relief based on an
intervening Supreme Court case directly on point). This rule is not without
limitations, however, for the "change" must be more than a clarification of existing
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relevant changes in the law fall into three main categories: (1)
a change relating to the crime underlying the' guilty plea; (2) a
change relating to a defense to that crime; or (3) a change in
the sentencing or other post-conviction consequences of the
crime.41 While changes in any one of these categories could
undermine the reason why a defendant entered into a plea
agreement, courts using the current test simply focus on
whether the change affects a defendant's claim of innocence.
Because most of these changes do not affect a defendant's fac-
tual innocence, courts have frequently denied motions to with-
draw guilty pleas based upon an intervening change in the law.
A. CHANGE RELATING TO THE UNDERLYING CRIME
A change in the law relating to the crime underlying the
guilty plea itself provides the strongest basis for withdrawing a
guilty plea. If the change decriminalizes the conduct to which
the defendant pled guilty, the defendant is now "innocent"-
both factually and legally-thus satisfying the most important fac-
tor of the current test.4"
principles. See, e.g., Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 812 F. Supp. 808, 811-12
(N.D. Ill. 1992) ("Legislative efforts to correct judicial decision making where there is
an interpretative chasm must by definition entail more than 'clarification"' and
instead be "a change in the law."). Moreover, it must be a change of controlling law
and not a different interpretation by a non-binding court. See, e.g., Schneider v.
Stokes Vacuum, Inc., Civ. No. 94-0282, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10745, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 4, 1994); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Ameri-Tel, Inc., No. 91-C-4277,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10434, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1994); Modern Publishing v.
Landoll, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 22, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a decision by another
district courtjudge "cannot be regarded as a "controlling decision .... Decisions that
are 'controlling in this Court, which is to say binding upon it, are issued by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court"); Dowell v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (S.D. W. Va. 1991) (not finding a change
of law because the new decisions "[s] imply provided clarity through a critical analysis
of legislative intent and state public policy"), affd, 993 F.3d 46 (4th Cir. 1993);
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 130 F.R.D. 617, 619 (M.D.N.C. 1990) ("[A]n
opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals will not alter decisional law
previously enunciated by the North Carolina Supreme Court.");.
" See, e.g., United States v. Andrade, 83 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (a
change relating to the underlying crime); United States v. Vallejo, 476 F.2d 667 (3d
Cir. 1973) (a change relating to sentencing); United States v. Lucia, 416 F.2d 920
(5th Cir. 1969), affd, 423 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (a change relating to a
defense to the underlying crime).
4 See, e.g., Stanback v. United States, 113 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1997) ("In
electing to plead guilty . . . the defendant waives a challenge to the facts underlying
the charge, but he does not waive the right to contest whether those facts are
sufficient to constitute a crime."); Lee v. United States, 113 F.3d 73, 75 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding on a habeas petition that although a guilty plea waives a challenge to
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For instance, in United States v. Andrade," the defendant pled
guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), which prohibited
the use of a firearm in the context of a drug trafficking offense.
While the defendant's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
held that the mere possession of a firearm was insufficient to
constitute "use" under the statute.4  Because the defendant's
guilty plea established the mere possession of a gun, "the de-
fendant pleaded guilty to something that is not a crime" and
thus the court permitted the defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea.45 Similarly, in United States v. Presley,46 the defendant en-
tered a plea of nolo contendere to several interstate gambling
offenses. However prior to sentencing, a Supreme Court deci-
sion47 tightened the interstate commerce element of those gam-
bling offenses. Because the defendant's conduct did not meet
the newly-restricted interstate commerce element, he now had a
claim of innocence. After promptly acting to assert that claim,
the court permitted the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. 8
the facts themselves, it does not waive the "right to challenge whether those facts
constituted a crime"); United States v. Broadus, 450 F.2d 639, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(In permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea based upon an intervening Supreme
Court case, the court held "[t]hus, in essence, he pleaded guilty to nothing. The
Government, therefore, does not have the usual interest in punishing a man who
admits committing a crime, and the guilty plea should not be allowed to accomplish
what the Government could not constitutionally accomplish through legislation.");
United States v. Liguori, 438 F.2d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1971) (reversing a conviction
because of a change in the law as to the elements of the offense); United States v.
McMillan, 914 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (E.D. La. 1996) (permitting the withdrawal of a
plea based upon a change in the law relating to the underlying crime).
83 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
Id. at 731; see also United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 952 (5th Cir. 1994)
(reversing a conviction stemming from a guilty plea because an intervening Supreme
Court decision invalidated the statute upon which the conviction was based); Ingber
v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1988) (The court, in a habeas case, permitted
the withdrawal of the plea based upon a change in the law because "[w]ere we to
penalize [the defendant] for failing to challenge such entrenched precedent, we
would ascribe to attorneys and their clients the power to prognosticate with greater
precision than the judges of this court. Such a rule would encourage appeals of even
well-settled points of law. We see no value in imposing a responsibility to pursue such
a 'patently futile' course.").
4'478 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1973).
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
4' Presley, 478 F.2d at 168; see also United States v. Garcia, No. 95-2186, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5324 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 1996) (vacating guilty plea because Bailey was
decided while the case was on appeal); 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTCE, PLEAS
OF GuILTY 84 (13th ed. 1990) ("[W]here the governing law has changed and the
defendant would no longer be guilty of the offense of conviction under the
governing law, the defendant should be able to withdraw the plea.").
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Thus, if the change relates to the actual crime contained in the
guilty plea itself, courts have consistently permitted defendants
to withdraw their pleas because "innocence" has been estab-
lished 9
A more interesting question arises, however, when the
change in the law concerns one of the indicted charges not
found in the guilty plea itself. In other words, the crime con-
tained in the ultimate guilty plea still stands, but at least one of
the others dropped by the government in consideration for the
defendant agreeing to the plea is no longer valid. In such a
situation, courts have taken the opposite stance-because the
crime underlying the guilty plea is still valid, so too is the plea
agreement. The defendant has no claim of innocence.
For instance, in United States v. Muriel,50 the defendant pled
guilty to a single crime in exchange for the government drop-
ping two additional charges. Prior to sentencing, an interven-
ing Supreme Court decision essentially nullified one of the
charges that had been dropped, and the defendant brought a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.5' Even though the plea had
less value for the defendant following the Supreme Court's rul-
ing, the court noted that he had received valuable consideration
for the plea because the conduct amounted to a crime at the
time of the agreement." The court held, therefore, that the de-
fendant could not withdraw his plea merely because the
dropped charges now looked "weaker."" For the court, because
the defendant was still guilty of the crime contained in the plea,
the defendant was still bound by the agreement.54 Thus, de-
pending upon the structure of the guilty plea, i.e., which
" See also United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 1996) (permitting the
withdrawal of a plea based on an intervening Supreme Court decision); United States
v. Andrade, 83 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. McMillan, 914 F.
Supp. 1387 (E.D. La. 1996) (same).
50 111 F.3d 975 (lst Cir. 1997).
" See id. at 977.
52 See id. at 979-80.
53 Id. at 980; see also United States v. Aker, 181 F.3d 167, 171 (1st Cir. 1999)
(denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because the motion was merely "an after-
the-fact recalculation of risks and rewards"); United States v. Knight, 96 F.3d 307, 309(8th Cir. 1996) (denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because the defendant
received other consideration for pleading guilty beyond the dropped charge); United
States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (permitting the withdrawal
of a guilty plea because the defendant received "nothing of value in exchange for her
plea").
" Muriel, 111 F.3d at 980.
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charges were dropped and which remained, the current test of
innocence produces conflicting results.
B. CHANGE RELATING TO A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO THE
UNDERLYING CRIME
In the second category of cases, the elements of the crime
found in the guilty plea remain the same, but the law changes
with respect to a defense that the defendant could raise to rebut
those elements. In other words, the defendant still admits to
the conduct that amounts to a crime but asks the court to disre-
gard that clear evidence based upon a newly available defense,
such as entrapment, an illegal search and seizure, a violation of
the defendant's right against self-incrimination, or a lack of
mental capacity.55 Because a new defense could establish a de-
fendant's legal innocence, some courts have permitted defen-
dants to withdraw their pleas based on such a change.
For instance, in United States v. Lucia,5 the defendant pled
guilty to failing to pay an excise tax on gambling winnings un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 371. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court
held that invoking the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination provided a complete bar to prosecution under
that statute. Because the intervening decision gave Lucia a
complete defense to the charge, the court permitted the with-
drawal of the guilty plea.58
Other courts have found such changes to be insufficient to
withdraw a guilty plea on the basis that legal innocence cannot
overcome factual guilt. In other words, because the defendant
had previously admitted his or her factual guilt at the plea hear-
ing, the later assertion of legal innocence is therefore deemed
insufficient.59 For example, in United States v. Morris,6° the de-
"See, e.g., United States v. Lucia, 416 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1969), affd, 423 F.2d 697
(5th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (right against self-incrimination); United States v. Morris,
Crim. No. 98-133, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13321 (E.D. Pa. Aug., 31, 1999) (illegal
search and seizure).
" 416 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
57 See Lucia, 416 F.2d at 921 (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968),
and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)).
58 See Lucia, 416 F.2d at 926; see generally United States v. Schubert, 728 F.2d 1364,
1366-67 (11th Cir. 1984) (permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea where the
defendant subsequently learned of facts supporting an entrapment defense).
'9 See, e.g., United States v. Morris, Crim. No. 98-133, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13321,
at *16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999); see also United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529 (7th Cir.
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fendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea based upon a change
in suppression law. The court rejected the defendant's motion,
holding that the defendant's admission of guilt at the plea hear-
ing precluded consideration of the new legal defense. 6' Thus,
under the current test, even legal innocence is uncertain to
provide relief to a defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea.
C. CHANGE TO SENTENCING LAW OR OTHER POST-CONVICTION
CONSEQUENCES
The final category involves those changes relating to sen-
tencing law or other post-conviction consequences of a plea. As
with changes permitting new defenses to the crime, the defen-
dant's admission of factual guilt is untouched by these types of
changes. However, unlike changes providing newly available
defenses, these changes to post-conviction consequences of the
plea do not establish a defendant's legal innocence. Instead,
they only relate to the consequences of the defendant's factual
admission of guilt and do not create a defense to the underlying
crime. The key factor of "innocence" required under the cur-
rent test is therefore not met.
In light of this failure to raise a new theory of innocence,
courts have routinely rejected motions based upon changes in
the law relating to the sentencing consequences of a guilty plea.
For instance, in United States v. Vallejo,6 the defendant sought to
withdraw his guilty plea based on an intervening Supreme Court
case that limited ajudge's sentencing discretion. Even though
the consequence of the plea had changed, the court rejected
the defendant's request to withdraw his plea. The factual cir-
cumstances underlying the plea had not changed, and the de-
fendant knew that by pleading guilty, he "ran the risk of a
substantial jail sentence and fine .... Although the risks of
1998) (rejecting a guilty plea challenge based upon a change in the law to a defense
to the crime).
" Crim. No. 98-133, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13321 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999).
61 See id. at *16-19. The court further held that the intervening Supreme Court
decision did not amount to a change in the law. See id. at *20-27.
62 476 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1973).
65 See id. at 670.
6' Id.; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (rejecting a challenge to a
guilty plea even though the mandatory death sentence that the defendant had faced
prior to the plea was later ruled unconstitutional); Tanceusz v. United States, 831
F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987) (unpublished per curiam decision) (holding that a change
in parole guidelines after the entry of a guilty plea does not warrant its withdrawal);
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the plea had changed, the underlying admission of guilt still
stood.6' And under the current test, without proof of inno-
cence, no relief can be granted.
Changes to non-sentencing consequences of a plea fare no
better.66 Not only do such changes fail to give a defendant any
claim of innocence, but courts have also consistently held that
such changes are simply too remote to form a basis to withdraw
a guilty plea. For instance, prior to accepting a guilty plea,
courts are required to ensure that defendants know of the direct
consequences of a plea-"those having a 'definite, immediate
and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's
punishment. ' ,'6  These direct consequences include the range
of possible sentences" but not the specific sentence that the de-
fendant will ultimately receive.69 Courts are also not required to
tell defendants about any "collateral" consequences of the plea,
Yanasak v. Seiter, No. 86-3504, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 2751 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a change in the law eliminating the possibility for death sentence did not warrant
withdrawing the guilty plea).
" Vallejo, 476 F.2d at 669-71.
66 See Xun v. Vasquez, No. C 92-2214, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19133 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
6, 1992) (holding that a change in the law relating to deportation did not justify the
withdrawal of a plea); see also Guerra v. United States, No. 96 Civ. 8425, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 92, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1997) ("[T]here is no reason to suppose that
the change in the law relating to deportation would have led the Court to grant an
application by [the defendant] to withdraw his guilty plea simply because the
collateral consequences of conviction changed after the plea was entered.").
6' Bryant v. Cherry, 687 F.2d 48, 50 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting Cuthrell v. Patuxent
Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973)).
See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 601 F.2d 1100, 1101 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(holding that a trial court was required only to give the sentencing range and does
not need to inform the defendant of a mandatory special parole).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that a trial court need only tell the defendant of the minimum and
maximum sentences and does not need to perform sentencing guideline
calculations); United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988)
(reversing a guilty plea because the defendant was not told of the possible minimum
and maximum sentences); Hunter v. Fogg, 616 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, a defendant must be told of the
maximum and minimum sentences); Lewis, 601 F.2d at 1101 ("Rule 11 does not
require that the court inform the defendant of the probability of his receiving one
sentence or another. Indeed it is improper to do so.") (citing Hinds v. United States,
429 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1970)); Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 415 (3d Cir.
1973) (same); Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266, 269 (5th Cir. 1967) (same);
Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689, 692 (1st Cir. 1969) (holding that the court
need not give the defendant "a detail of every consequence of his sentence, but the
loss of something important enough to make a deprivation after sentence
constitutionally impermissible, is a matter of which a defendant should be informed
in advance." (citation omitted)).
290 KIRKE D. WEA VER [Vol. 92
such as confinement conditions, 0 "the possibility of revocation
of parole, potential deportation, and parole eligibility.7" If
these collateral consequences later change, courts accordingly
dismiss any consideration of the change: if a defendant does not
have the right to know about these consequences at the time of
the plea,74 why should these consequences matter after they
have changed? Even though such changes might fundamentally
alter the consequences of a plea for the defendant, the changes
are simply irrelevant to the court's decision. Without providing
a credible claim of innocence-and in some cases, factual inno-
cence-the motion will not be granted under the current test.
III. CONTRACT LAW AND MOTIONS To WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS
With innocence as their primary standard, courts have rou-
tinely denied requests to withdraw guilty pleas based upon
changes in the law. Defendants have, therefore, been forced to
abide by plea agreements that look drastically different in light
of intervening changes in the law. But are courts achieving the
correct result? Should more defendants be able to re-evaluate
their decisions to plead guilty based upon relevant changes in
the law? One framework for evaluating the courts' performance
70 See, e.g., United States v. Levine, 457 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding
that a court did not need to inform the defendant that his plea would not release him
from segregated confinement).
71 See, e.g., United States v. King, 618 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1980).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States
v. Chavez-Huerto, 972 F.2d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1992); Cordero v. United States, 553
F.2d 723, 726 (1st Cir. 1965); Guerra v. United States, No. 96 Civ. 8425, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 92, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1997) (memorandum opinion).
71 See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 1984) ("The details of
parole eligibility are considered collateral rather than direct consequences of a plea,
of which a defendant need not be informed before pleading guilty."); Cepulonis v.
Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436,
441 (D.C. Cir. 1963). But see United States v. Sanclemente-Bejarano, 861 F.2d 206,
209 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a court must disclose supervised release which "may
increase the length of the ultimate sentence"); Trujillo, 377 F.2d at 269 (holding that
a court must inform the defendant of his ineligibility for parole).
74 See FED. R. CriM. P. 11; see also Cepulonis, 699 F.2d at 577 ("Ordinarily, the details
of parole eligibility are considered collateral rather than direct consequences of a
plea, of which a defendant need not be informed before pleading guilty."); United
States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam) ("The trial court is
not required later on motion to withdraw the plea to consider possible ancillary or
consequential results which are peculiar to the individual and which may flow from a
conviction on a plea of guilty .. "); United States v. Lott, 630 F. Supp. 611, 612 (E.D.
Va. 1986) (holding that a trial court need not advise a defendant of collateral
consequences).
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is one that is deeply embedded in the jurisprudence surround-
ing plea agreements-contract law. Courts have routinely ap-
plied contract law to interpret or enforce plea agreements.
However, because contract law was not specifically designed to
apply in the criminal context, courts have not slavishly followed
the commercially-driven contract law rules.76 Instead, contract
law has provided broad tenets under which courts are better
equipped to evaluate and consistently adjudicate disputes con-
cerning plea agreements. Courts have relied upon these prin-. 77
ciples not simply to interpret plea agreements, but also to
evaluate the potential impact of subsequent events on these
agreements.7 s A change in the law is simply another example of
71 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 198 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying
the contract law principle of mutual mistake of fact to evaluate a challenge to a guilty
plea); United States v. Standiford, 148 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying the
contract law principle of condition subsequent to a challenge to a guilty plea); Kraus
v. United States, No. 93-3618, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4168, at *9 (7th Cir. Mar. 1,
1995) (applying the contract law principle of inducement by fraud to a challenge to a
guilty plea); United States v. Clarke, No. 95-30073, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38850, at
*3-5 (9th Cir.Jan. 9, 1995) (interpreting a guilty plea agreement using a "contract law
analysis"); Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Plea agreements
are contractual in nature, and are interpreted according 'to general contract
principles."); Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281 (7th Cir. 1983) ("A plea
bargain is, in law, just another contract.").
76 See, e.g., United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A plea
bargain is not a commercial exchange. It is an instrument for the enforcement of
criminal law. What is at stake for the defendant is his liberty. On rescission of the
agreement, the prisoner can never be returned to his 'original position'; he has
served time by reason of his guilty plea and his surrender of basic constitutional
rights; the time he has spent in prison can never be restored, nor can his cooperation
in his punishment. What is at stake for the government is its interest in securing just
punishment for violation of the law and its interest that an innocent act not be
punished at all."); United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Plea
agreements are like contracts; however, they are not contracts, and therefore contract
doctrines do not always apply to them."); United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629,
634 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The contract analogy is imperfect."); Gov't of Virgin Islands v.
Springette, 614 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that although guilty pleas are
usually interpreted using contract law principles, "constitutional standards require
more than contract principles."); Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1972)
("Plea bargaining is an accepted folkway of our criminal jurisprudence onto which
some, but not all, contract criteria have been superimposed.").
" See, e.g., Margalli-Olvera, 43 F.3d at 352-53 (using contract law principles to
interpret whether the INS was bound by the terms of the guilty plea); United States v.
Roberts, No. 91-1721, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20528, at *6 (1st Cir. Sept. 1, 1992)
("Our interpretation of contested plea agreements is guided by general principles of
contract law.").
7" See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, No. 97-1687, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5424, at
*11-17 (2d. Cir. April 2, 2001) (holding that under contract law principles a breach of
a guilty plea by the defendant relieved the government of its obligations under the
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a subsequent event that courts can evaluate using these broad
contract law principles-principles that are rigid enough to
provide consistency while at the same time flexible enough to
provide for just decisions.
Contract law includes a wide range of doctrines designed to
alleviate unjust or unequal contract terms, such as those arising
because of a change in the law. The purpose of these doctrines
is to decide when a contract's terms are so unjust or so unequal
that society has a greater interest in the non-performance of the
contract rather than the full performance of its terms. In de-
termining which doctrine a court should apply to make such ajudgment, two factors are important: (1) whether the "injus-
tice" arose because of the actions of one party" or through no
fault of either party;0 and (2) whether the "injustice" existed at
the creation of the contract or arose from subsequent events.
In the case of a change in the law affecting a guilty plea, the
potential "injustice" does not arise through any action or fault
of either party. Instead, the intervening change is an inde-
pendent event, not influenced by either party. Thus, those con-
tract law doctrines dealing exclusively with party-created fault do
not provide much assistance. Moreover, a change in the law is
an intervening event, arising after the formulation of the guilty
plea agreement. In fact, the very nature of a "change" in the
law is that it alters the then-existing legal landscape. ' If con-
agreement); United States v. Carrara, 49 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
the government's failure to file a § 5k1.1 motion did not amount to a breach of the
plea agreement because the defendant had already failed to perform under the
contract); United States v. Alvarez, No. 91-50848, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 18794, at *7-
15 (9th Cir. July 22, 1993) (holding that under contract law principles a breach of the
guilty plea by the defendant freed the government from its obligations under the
agreement).
79 Doctrines involving this type of situation include fraud, undue influence,
unconscionability and lack of capacity.
'0 Doctrines involving this type of situation include mutual mistake and illegality.
Some doctrines, however, can apply in both situations, such as impracticality, failure
of consideration, frustration of purpose, and impossibility.
8 Doctrines involving this type of situation include fraud, mutual mistake, undue
influence, unconscionability, and lack of capacity.
82 Doctrines involving this type of situation include impossibility, frustration of
purpose, failure of consideration, and impracticality, and illegality.
" An argument can be made that the change was actually an existing condition
(although unknown to either party) at the time of the bargain. Under this theory,
the decision announcing the "change" was not necessarily a change in the law, but
rather was a decision announcing the "proper" interpretation of a statute or an
existing precedent. The parties to the guilty plea were, therefore, operating under a
mistaken view of the relevant statute or case law when they entered into the plea.
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tract law is to provide an apt analogy, the selected doctrine
must, therefore, address changes that happen without the fault
of either party and that occur after the contract's formation.
Two doctrines fit these criteria-impracticability and frustration
of purpose. Applying these doctrines to motions to withdraw
guilty pleas based upon changes in the law demonstrates that
courts have been unduly restrictive in granting such motions.
The current standard of "innocence" fails to capture all cases of
legitimate inequality.
A. DOCTRINE OF IMPRACTICABILITY
Courts apply the doctrine of impracticability where an in-
tervening event causes one party's performance under the con-
tract to be made "impracticable." In order to gain relief under
the doctrine, a party must demonstrate: (1) an intervening
event; (2) the event occurred without the fault of either party;
(3) a basic assumption of the contract was that the event would
not occur; and (4) the event makes one party's performance
impracticable .84
For instance, in Specialty Tires of America, Inc. v. The CIT
Group, the defendant was a major equipment leasing company
that had leased certain tire presses to a third party, Condere.
After Condere breached its leases and entered bankruptcy, the
leasing company found a buyer for the equipment, and Con-
dere agreed to the removal of the presses from its factory. Yet,
after the contract was signed, Condere refused to permit access
to the presses and instead sought to maintain possession of
them. In the buyer's subsequent breach of contract suit, the
leasing company asserted a defense of impracticability-it could
not deliver the goods because Condere would not allow access
Accepting this theory would permit the comparative use of the contract law doctrine
of mutual mistake-where both parties enter into a contract under a mistaken
assumption that was central to the performance of the contract. However, the
comparison seems to involve some overreaching. Although courts consistently speak
of merely interpreting existing case law or applying existing law to new factual
situations rather than "creating" new law, the decisions undoubtedly create new
reference points or precedent on which parties rely-precedent that was unavailable
to the parties when they entered into the plea agreement. Comparing a change in
the law to an intervening event would, therefore, seem to be a more apt analogy.
84 See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 261 (1981); see also Central Kansas
Credit Union v. Mutual Guar. Corp., 102 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 1996); Dorn v.
Stanhope Steel, Inc., 534 A.2d 798, 811-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); West v. Peoples First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 106 A.2d 427, 432 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954).
" 82 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
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to them. Condere's actions occurred after the contract was
signed and happened without the fault of either party.8 6 Moreo-
ver, both the buyer and seller shared the same basic assump-
tion-that the presses would be available and that possession
would not be contested . While the event was foreseeable "in
some general sense," its occurrence was so remote that the par-
ties reasonably had not addressed the situation in their con-
tract.88 Instead, it was a "'bolt out of the blue."' 89 Thus, the
court excused the leasing company's failure to deliver the
presses based on the doctrine of impracticability.90
In the context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea based
upon a change in the law, two of the impracticability doctrine's
requirements are always met. First, the change in the law occurs
after the formation of the plea agreement;' and second, the
change occurs without the "fault" of either party.92 The crux of
the analysis centers, therefore, on the third and fourth factors
of the doctrine-whether the parties assumed the change would
not happen and whether the change truly made the defendant's
performance impracticable.
In applying these two factors, courts have imposed certain
key limitations that are relevant here. For instance, a party's
performance is not impracticable because it is more burden-
some or because the performance produces less value than ex-
pected. Instead, the intervening event must result in a burden
86 Id. at 441.
17 Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 438-39.
'9 Id. at 441.
'0 See also Karl Wendt Farm Equip. Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 931 F.2d 1112 (6th
Cir. 1991); International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 886-87
(10th Cir. 1985) (finding impracticability based on an intervening government
regulation); Asphalt Int'l, Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp., S.A., 667 F.2d 261 (2d
Cir. 1981); Rockland Indus., Inc. v. E+E (US) Inc., 991 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D. Md.
1998) (declining to apply the doctrine where the risk was foreseeable); Ellwood City
Forge Corp. v. Forth Worth Heat Treating Co., 636 A.2d 219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
9' If not, the change would not form the basis for a motion to withdraw a plea,
because the parties should have known of the change. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONTRAcTs § 266 (1981) (permitting the application of impracticability doctrine
based on existing condition only where the party "has no reason to know" of the
condition). '
9 One could make an argument that the change might be the "fault" of the
prosecutor because the decision was rendered by another officer of the government.
However, this connection is too attenuated to sustain.
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to one party that the contract did not intend to cover.9 Moreo-
ver, in order for the intervening event to provide a basis for
non-performance, both parties to the contract must have as-
sumed that the event would not happen.94 If one party enters
into the contract based on a hidden assumption, that party can-
not expect relief when that assumption fails to hold. The doc-
trine of impracticability will only provide relief where the party
shares that assumption with the other party at the time of the
creation of the contract.
1. Change Relating to the Underlying Crime
Under the current "innocence" test, courts permit defen-
dants to withdraw their guilty pleas if the subsequent change in
the law invalidates the underlying crime. The impracticability
doctrine produces the same result. In negotiating the plea
agreement, both the government and the defendant assume
that the charge to which the defendant pled guilty was a crime
and would remain a crime. In fact, this assumption is one of the
most, if not the most, basic premises underlying the plea agree-
ment itself. A change in the law affecting the underlying charge
would destroy this assumption. Moreover, the change in the law
would not simply make the defendant's performance more dif-
ficult or the government's promises less valuable; instead, en-
forcing the plea agreement would force a defendant to serve
prison time for an invalid conviction. If the underlying crime
no longer exists, the defendant's performance (i.e., serving time
in prison) has been rendered impracticable.93 Thus, in the case
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNTRAcrs § 261 cmt. d (1981) (" [I] mpracticability
means more than 'impracticality.' A mere change in the degree of difficulty or
expense due to such causes as increased wages, prices of raw materials, or costs of
construction, unless well beyond the normal range, does not amount to
impracticability .... ); see also Karl Wendt Farm Equip. Co., 931 F.2d at 1117; Bustop
Shelters, Inc. v. Classic Homes, Inc., 900 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished
decision); Days Inn of Am., Inc. v. Patel, 88 F. Supp. 2d 928 (C.D. Ill. 2000); Satellite
Receivers, Ltd. v. Household Bank (Nevada) N.A., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (E.D. Wis.
1999); Lavin v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 980 F. Supp. 93 (D. Conn. 1997); Columbian
Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Township Title Serv., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 796 (D. Kan. 1987).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNTRAcTs § 261 cmt. b (1981) (noting that the "non-
occurrence of that event must have been a 'basic assumption' on which both parties
made the contract"); see also Glazer Steel Corp. v. United States Metal Co., Civ. No.
81-1679, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10406, at *13-14 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1983) (refusing to
apply the doctrine where the assumption was not known to both parties).
" Of course, the defendant's performance would not be impossible, but the
doctrine of impracticability does not require as much.
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of a change to the underlying conviction, the doctrine of im-
practicality would permit the defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea.
What if the change affected a count of the indictment that
was dropped in exchange for the plea? Using the current test,
such a change is insufficient to withdraw a plea. However, un-
der the impracticability doctrine, the outcome is not as certain.
First, while both parties may have doubts as to whether a jury
would convict the defendant of some or all of the counts
charged, both operate under the assumption that the counts in
the indictment are, in fact, crimes and will continue to be
crimes for which the defendant could potentially be punished.
Based on that basic assumption (and factoring in the probability
of the government's success in proving each count), the parties
negotiate and ultimately enter into the plea agreement. If the
parties did not share this assumption, the negotiations and the
plea itself would look quite different-the defendant would
have obviously received a much more favorable plea agreement.
The change in the law alters this basic assumption and would
have changed the dynamics of the negotiations leading up to
the plea agreement.
But does the change make the defendant's performance
impracticable? Not necessarily. A court must weigh the effect
of the change against the initial indictment and the resulting
plea. For instance, assume a defendant faces a ten-count in-
dictment containing mostly relatively minor charges, such as
trespassing, and one more substantial charge, such as aggra-
vated assault. The resulting negotiations produce a plea of
guilty to a lesser included offense-simple assault. If the
change in the law only affects one of the minor charges, such as
trespassing, the defendant's performance will not be impracti-
cable. The agreement might not be as valuable to the defen-
dant as it once had been, but the relative benefit that the
defendant continues to receive from the agreement-the dis-
missal of the most serious charge-far outweighs the additional
burden of not having as beneficial a "deal" as the defendant
once had. On the other hand, if the change affected the more
important charge-the aggravated assault-the defendant's per-
formance might very well be impracticable. Serving significant
jail time in that situation simply to avoid minor charges would
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seem to impose an undue burden on the defendant.96 Thus, un-
like the current test's blanket rejection of such cases, the im-
practicability doctrine offers a more nuanced approach and
permits withdrawing a guilty plea in additional limited circum-
stances deserving of relief.
2. Change Relating to Complete Defenses to the Underlying Crime
Courts applying the current test are split as to whether to
permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if a change in the
law revives a defense to the crime contained in the plea.97 Un-
der the impracticability doctrine, defendants would consistently
receive relief in such cases.
The primary assumption for both parties to a plea agree-
ment is that the underlying conviction would remain valid. As
part of this assumption, the defendant waives any existing de-
fense to that conviction by agreeing to the plea. Yet a change in
the law is not, or should not, be part of this waiver-a defendant
cannot waive a right not yet known or even in existence at the
time of the plea. Pursuant to that change, the newly available
defense undermines the basic assumption that the underlying
conviction would remain valid, for it establishes the defendant's
legal innocence of the crime.
Accepting that the change altered a basic assumption of the
contract, the impracticability of the defendant's performance
should also be evident. As with the change to the underlying
crime itself, a change providing a defense to the crime would
force a defendant to serve prison time even though the defen-
dant is now innocent of the crime. Performance by the defen-
dant is not simply more difficult or less valuable; it imposes a
burden far beyond what the plea agreement intended to cover.
Thus, as with the change to the elements of the crime itself, the
For instance, in United States v. Muriel, 111 F.3d 975 (lst Cir. 1997), the
defendant pled guilty to the lesser offense of a felon-in-possession of a firearm in
exchange for the dismissal of the charge of using a firearm during a drug transaction
and a charge of drug possession. Even though a subsequent change in the law
invalidated "the most serious charge" of using a firearm during a drug transaction,
the court denied relief. Id. at 978-79. Under the impracticability doctrine, the result
might very well have been different. And at the very least, the defendant would have
been given the opportunity to argue that he deserved relief because the allocated
burdens under the plea agreement were so altered by the change in the law.
"7 Compare United States v. Lucia, 416 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1969), affd, 423 F.2d 697
(5th Cir. 1970) (en banc), with United States v. Morris, Crim. No. 98-133, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13321 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999).
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newly available defense causes the defendant's performance to
be impracticable and should provide the defendant with relief.
3. Change to Sentencing Law or Other Post-Conviction Consequences
While under the current test a change to any post-
conviction consequence of the plea agreement provides no re-
lief, the impracticability doctrine permits a defendant to with-
draw his or her plea in limited circumstances.
First, not all changes to post-conviction consequences of a
plea will affect a basic assumption known to both parties. For in-
stance, even though a court does not need to inform defendants
about certain post-conviction consequences such as deporta-
tion, some defendants are acutely aware of these consequences.
In fact, a defendant might actually agree to a plea agreement
solely because it would prevent his or her deportation. Under
that scenario, a change in immigration law that resulted in the
defendant's subsequent deportation would fundamentally alter
the nature of the plea and change the basic assumption under
which the defendant was operating. However, the impractica-
bility doctrine requires the other party to the contract to share
this assumption. Unless the defendant communicated this as-
sumption and its importance to the prosecutor, the impractica-
bility doctrine would not apply. Thus, a court is required to
examine the facts and circumstances of each case in order to
determine if such a basic assumption was known to both par-
ties.98
Second, not all changes in the post-conviction conse-
quences of a guilty plea make the defendant's performance im-
practicable-more burdensome perhaps, but not necessarily
impracticable. Assume that the defendant faced a potential sen-
tence of twenty years prior to pleading guilty and that a change
in the law decreased that potential sentence by only one year.
Under this scenario, the defendant might have been able to ne-
gotiate a more favorable plea agreement if the potential sen-
tence he or she faced was smaller. The defendant's
" See generally Guerra v. United States, No. 96 Civ. 8425, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1997); Xun v. Vasquez, No. C 92-2214, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19133
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 1992). In both cases, the law subsequently changed after the plea
agreement and subjected the defendants to deportation. While the courts denied
relief in both cases, had the defendant entered into the plea to avoid deportation and
told the government of this assumption, the impracticability doctrine would have
provided relief.
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performance under the plea is, therefore, more burdensome
than he or she otherwise expected. However, in light of the
lengthy sentence that the defendant faced, the change of a sin-
gle year does not rise to the level of impracticability. Thus, the
change is not great enough to warrant a wholesale revocation of
the plea. If, on the other hand, a subsequent change reduced
the potential twenty year sentence by one-half or by two-thirds,
performance under the plea would probably be considered im-
practicable. The doctrine permits courts to examine the facts
and circumstances of each individual case in order to decide
where this line of impracticability falls.9 Unlike the current test
of innocence, the impracticability doctrine provides courts with
discretion to grant motions to withdraw guilty pleas where the
circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the plea and the
nature of the change itself warrant relief.
B. DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE
Courts can conduct a similar analysis using the frustration
of purpose doctrine and provide relief in deserving circum-
stances.'0 As with impracticality, the frustration of purpose
doctrine requires: (1) an intervening change; (2) without the
moving party's fault; and (3) that both parties assumed would
not occur. 0' Instead of containing a fourth factor of impracti-
cability, however, this doctrine only requires that the change
frustrate, i.e. defeat, the moving party's principal purpose for
entering into the contract. And the "principal" purpose must
For instance, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the defendant pled
guilty in order to avoid a potential death sentence. Although the Supreme Court
later invalidated that sentencing possibility, the Court did not permit the defendant
to withdraw the guilty plea. Under the impracticability doctrine, this change would
have warranted the plea withdrawal because the elimination of the possibility of death
would seem to meet the standard of impracticability.
'00 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 266(2) (1981); see also Unihealth v.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 623, 634 (D.N.J. 1998); Alvino v. Carraccio, 162
A.2d 358, 361 (Pa. 1960); Harford County, MD v. Town of Bel Air, 704 A.2d 421, 431
(Md. Ct. App. 1998); Dorn v. Stanhope Steel, Inc., 534 A.2d 798, 812 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987); Howard v. Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 477, 481-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
'01 Courts will not provide relief if the risk was assumed or reasonably foreseeable.
See, e.g., United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Vill., Inc. 508 F.2d 377,
382 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the party had assumed the risk); Wheelabrator
Envtl. Sys., Inc. v. Galante, 136 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that the
change in law was foreseeable); Amoco Oil Co. v. Gomez, 125 F. Supp. 2d 492, 505-06
(S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that the event was foreseeable); Sage Realty Corp. v.
Jugobanka, D.D., No. 95-Civ-0323, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15756, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
8. 1998) (holding that the event was foreseeable).
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be exactly that-the prime motivating factor for entering into
the agreement. 1
0 2
For instance, in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Federal Sav. & Loan
Ins. Corp.,' 3 the FSLIC took over a failed savings and loan until it
found new investors to operate the institution. However, the in-
vestors were only permitted to run the institution by using spe-
cial accounting rules that were created to encourage the
turnaround of failed savings and loans. Subsequently, a new
federal statute outlawed the use of these special rules. Based on
this change, the investors sought to rescind their contract be-
cause the primary purpose of the contract had been to "acquire
and operate profitably" the savings and loan-a purpose that
was destroyed by the intervening federal statutory change.' 4
Because neither party caused or foresaw the change, the court
released the investors from their contract. 10 5
As with impracticability, the two initial requirements of the
frustration of purpose doctrine are always met in the case of a
change in the law. The change is an intervening event, and it
occurs without the fault of either party. The analysis, therefore
focuses on the assumption that the change would not occur and
that the party's principal purpose is frustrated by that change.
To prevent the over-application of the doctrine, the courts have
likewise clarified these latter two requirements: the purpose
must be known to and understood by both parties; 06 and the
12 See, e.g., Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 102 (3d Cir.
1986) (rejecting the application of the doctrine because the changed purpose was
only secondary and not the primary reason for entering into the contract); Everett
Plywood Corp. v. United States, 1979 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 1060, at *45-46 (Ct. Cl. Dec.
28, 1979) (applying the doctrine where the principal purpose known to both parties
was frustrated even though the purpose differed from the normal contracting
situation).
... 25 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1994).
'4Id. at 1503.
'05 Id.; see also U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d. at 637 (finding a frustration of
purpose based on an intervening legislative act); Federal Check Exch., Inc. v. Brink's
Inc., No. 88-5631, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3986, at *4-6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 1989) (same
with regard to an intervening regulatory decision); Federal Leasing Consultants, Inc.
v. Mitchell Lipsett Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 44 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1978)
(same).
,06RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACrS § 265 cmt. a (1981) ("It is not enough that
he had in mind some specific object without which he would not have made the
contract. The object must be so completely the basis of the contract that, as both
parties understand, without it the transaction would make little sense."); Karl Wendt
Farm Equip. Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 931 F.2d 1112, 1119 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the purpose must be known to both parties); Waegemann v. Montgomery Ward
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purpose must be substantially frustrated and not merely produce
a less favorable result. °7 By adding these latter requirements,
frustration of purpose is similar to impracticability in that both
doctrines encourage parties to share their basic assumptions,
and they only grant relief under the most deserving circum-
stances.
1. Changes to the Underlying Crime or Complete Defenses to the Underlying
Crime
The application of the frustration of purpose doctrine is es-
sentially the same regardless of whether the change affects the
underlying crime or simply provides a new defense to that
crime. As with the impracticability analysis, both parties as-
sumed that the underlying conviction would remain valid. The
more important question therefore is whether the change in the
law frustrated the defendant's principal purpose for entering
into the plea agreement. If a court were to permit the defen-
dant to withdraw the guilty plea, the government's principal pur-
pose for the agreement-having the defendant serve jail time-
would clearly be frustrated. And a number of courts have ap-
plied the frustration of purpose analysis to justify permitting the
government's re-indictment of a defendant after a successful
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
108
& Co., 713 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the purpose must be the
"'fundamental reason of both parties for entering into the contract'); Sabine Corp.
v. ONG Western, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1179 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (holding that
merely because some customers were lost was insufficient); Seaboard Lumber Co. v.
United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 401, 417 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (applying the doctrine where the
"basic rationale recognized by both parties entering into the contract, has been
destroyed by a supervening and unforeseen event"); Molnar v. Molnar, 313 N.W.2d
171 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
107 See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 869 F.2d 310, 315
(7th Cir. 1989); Waegemann, 713 F.2d at 454; Butler Mfg. Co. v. Americold Corp., 850
F. Supp. 952, 957 (D. Kan. 1994) ("'Under the doctrine of frustration, performance
remains possible, but is excused because a fortuitous event supervenes to cause a
failure of the consideration or a practically total destruction of the expected value of
the performance."' (citation omitted)); Conlon Group, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 980
S.W.2d 37, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that even though the change caused
costs to increase substantially, the purpose of the contract had not been destroyed);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNTRACTs § 265 cmt. a (1981) ("[T]he frustration
must be substantial. It is not enough that the transaction has become less profitable
for the affected party or even that he will sustain a loss. The frustration must be so
severe that it is not fairly to be regarded as within the risks that he assumed under the
contract.").
,o8 See, e.g., United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1998)
(applying the frustration of purpose doctrine to permit the government to reindict
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But would the change in the law frustrate the defendant's
known principal purpose? Yes. In most cases, the defendant's
principal purpose for entering into a guilty plea agreement is to
avoid the possibility of a longer sentence that could result after
a full trial. The invalidation of the underlying crime or a com-
plete defense to that crime would dramatically alter that pur-
pose-the defendant would be serving time for a crime that
would have posed absolutely no risk at trial. Eliminating that
risk eliminates the defendant's purpose for entering into the
plea. The frustration of purpose doctrine would, therefore,
provide the same relief that the impracticability doctrine does.
What if the change related to a charge that had been
dropped in exchange for the guilty plea? Would the doctrine
provide relief for the defendant? As with the impracticability
analysis, the answer is a definite maybe. If the change related to
a more serious charge that would dramatically alter the defen-
dant's principal purpose-avoiding a much longer sentence fol-
lowing conviction at trial-then the frustration of purpose
doctrine should provide the defendant with relief. However, if
the change only affects a minor charge, the defendant's princi-
pal purpose is not substantially frustrated-the plea still avoids a
potentially longer sentence that could have stemmed from the
main charges in the indictment. Thus, the frustration of pur-
the defendant); United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 1998) (same); see
also United States v. Thompson, 237 F.3d 1258, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying the
frustration of purpose doctrine to permit the government to reindict the defendant
where state officials frustrated the basic purpose of agreement); United States v.
Lewis, 138 F.3d 840, 841-43 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting the frustration of purpose
doctrine in requiring a challenge to a conviction following a guilty plea to apply to
the whole plea rather than one term of plea); see generally United States v. Ahlenius,
No. 98-1414, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26491, at *8-9 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 1999)
(unpublished opinion) (holding that the defendant could not rely on the frustration
of purpose doctrine to withdraw his guilty plea because he assumed the risk that thejudge would impose a stricter sentence than required). But see, e.g., United States v.
Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797, 800-02 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the government
could not reindict the defendant because the defendant's successful habeas corpus
challenge to the plea did not amount to a breach of the agreement); Rodriguez v.
United States, 933 F. Supp. 279, 281-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the defendant's
challenge to the conviction amounted to a breach of the plea agreement but holding
that the government could not reindict because the defendant could not "be restored
to [his former position]"); United States v. Gaither, 926 F. Supp. 50, 52-54 (M.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that while the defendant's challenge to his guilty plea was like the
application of the impracticability doctrine, the government was not free to reindict);
DiCesare v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 544, 548 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that the
government could not reindict the defendant because the defendant's successful
habeas corpus challenge to conviction did not amount to a breach of the agreement).
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pose doctrine provides essentially the same relief as the imprac-
ticability doctrine for these two categories of changes.
2. Change to Sentencing Law or Other Post-Conviction Consequences
The frustration of purpose doctrine can also offer defen-
dants limited relief in cases involving a change to the sentencing
or other post-conviction consequences of a guilty plea. In the
sentencing context, the analysis is easier for courts to apply be-
cause the change would usually affect the defendant's principal
purpose. As noted above, in iost cases the defendant's princi-
pal purpose for entering into the plea agreement is to avoid a
longer sentence following a full trial. Because this purpose is
the typical motivation for a defendant to enter into a guilty plea,
it is one that is known to both parties. If, therefore, the change
in the law greatly increases the potential sentence, it would sub-
stantially frustrate the defendant's principal purpose, and the
frustration of purpose doctrine would provide relief. On the
other hand, if the change only results in a minor increase to the
defendant's sentence, the purpose would not be substantially
frustrated, and a court would not grant a defendant relief under
the doctrine. Thus, a court's analysis would simply turn on
whether the change in the potential sentence was substantial
enough to warrant relief under the doctrine.
On the other hand, a change to non-sentencing post-
conviction consequences of a plea will not typically provide re-
lief under the frustration of purpose doctrine. Because a de-
fendant's principal purpose is usually to avoid a longer sentence
following a trial, a change to non-sentencing consequences of
the plea agreement would not affect this purpose. In certain
cases, however, a defendant's principal purpose for entering
into the plea agreement is not merely to avoid a longer sen-
tence. Instead, the defendant could enter into the agreement
specifically to avoid certain post-conviction consequences, such
as deportation. If the law subsequently changes with regard to
that consequence, the defendant's purpose for entering into
the agreement would be substantially frustrated-the purpose
would be completely defeated. And if the government was
aware of the defendant's motivation, the frustration of purpose
doctrine would provide relief to that defendant. Thus, much
like impracticability, the frustration of purpose doctrine can
provide certain defendants with relief in post-conviction conse-
2002]
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quence cases, depending upon the extent of the change and the
defendant's underlying purpose for agreeing to the plea.
IV. CONCLUSION
Changes in the criminal law are often followed by motions
by defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas based upon those
changes. Under the current "fair and just reason" standard ap-
plied by courts to evaluate such motions, only proof of the de-
fendant's actual innocence will provide a basis to withdraw a
guilty plea. And in some cases, not even legal innocence of the
charges is sufficient; only actual factual innocence will do.
While courts do consider other factors such as delay or preju-
dice to the government, these factors are secondary to inno-
cence. Courts do not use these factors to directly evaluate the
merits of the defendant's request; instead, they are used to
eliminate those motions brought to manipulate the system
rather than to earnestly seek relief. However, by essentially sub-
stituting innocence for a "fair and just reason," courts have un-
duly restricted a defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea in
light of an intervening change in the law. Instead of evaluating
the actual effect of intervening changes on the terms of and the
allocation of burdens found in guilty plea agreements, courts
have fallen prey to the siren's call of finality in an effort to pre-
vent a floodgate of defendants seeking to re-open their pleas
simply based upon a change of heart.
Contract law doctrines of impracticability and frustration of
purpose can provide a bulwark against that feared flood while at
the same time permitting those deserving defendants a chance
to re-evaluate the consequences of a suddenly and unexpectedly
oppressive plea agreement. Unlike the current test, these doc-
trines provide clear standards that are not only rigid enough to
provide consistency, but also flexible enough to permit courts to
consider the defendant's changed circumstances on a case by
case basis. Moreover, these doctrines contain internal factors,
such as requiring the sharing of basic assumptions between the
parties and requiring a substantial, rather than a trivial, change
in circumstances, that guard against post-hoc manipulation by
defendants. When used in conjunction with the existing delay
and prejudice factors of the current test (to provide a further
bar against purely manipulative motions), the doctrines of im-
practicability and frustration of purpose can provide courts with
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a valuable method to more fairly adjudicate these motions and
to provide relief to deserving defendants overlooked under the
present innocence test.
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